Dashnorët e mëdhenjë të Reformës së Drejtësisë, qeveritarët e majtë bashkë me diplomatë të atashuar në Tiranë pa harruar këtu edhe shoqatat që e projektuan dhe financuan, mesa duket, duke u marrë me hallin e Biden dhe Trump në Washington kishin harruar që sot në Strasburg luhej fati i vetë reformës dhe nuk morën mundimin as të lobonin.
Me vendimin e sotëm të Gjykatës Europiane të Drejtave të njeriut në Strasburgut, hapet autostrada e pranimit të padive të atyre gjyqtarëve e prokurorëve të larguar nga sistemi nga KPK dhe KPA të cilat nuk plotësojnë kushtet e një gjykate normale sipas konventës dhe të komisionerëve të cilët nuk plotësojnë kushtet për të qenë magjistratë po sipas konventës.
110 milionë € e Becchettit do na duken qindarka para dëmit ekonomik që ne taksapaguesit shqiptarë do na duhet të paguajmë për rilindjen e Drejtësisë Shqiptare. Të gjithë të larguarit jo vetëm që do kthehen në zyrën e mëparshme por do përfitojmë edhe dëmshpërblim të majmë.
Asnjë qeveritar, asnjë shoqatë apo diplomat i huaj nuk do mbajë përgjegjësi, ndaj edhe ligji në një rast të tillë duhet të ndryshojë. Boll më paguajnë Shqiptarët për vendimarrjet arbitrare të qeveritarëve, përgjegjësia duhet të bjerë mbi përgjegjësit, kushdo qofshin ato, me pashaporta Shqiptare apo të huaja.
Më poshtë vendimi i sotëm për rastin e ngjashëm në Iceland 👇
In today’s Grand Chamber judgment1 in the case of Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland
(application no. 26374/18) the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had
been: a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a tribunal established by law) of the European Convention on
The case concerned the applicant’s allegation that the new Icelandic Court of Appeal (Landsréttur)
which had upheld his conviction for road traffic offences was not “a tribunal established by law”, on
account of irregularities in the appointment of one of the judges who heard his case.
Given the potential implications of finding a violation and the important interests at stake, the Court took the view that the right to a “tribunal established by law” should not be construed too broadly such that any irregularity in a judicial appointment procedure would risk compromising that right.
It thus formulated a three-step test to determine whether irregularities in a judicial appointment
procedure were of such gravity as to entail a violation of the right to a tribunal established by law. It then proceeded to find as follows.
Over the past decades, the legal framework in Iceland governing judicial appointments had seen
some important changes aimed at limiting ministerial discretion in the appointments process and thereby strengthening the independence of the judiciary. Controls on ministerial power had been
further intensified in connection with the appointment of judges to the newly established Court of Appeal, where Parliament had been tasked with approving every candidate proposed by the
Minister of Justice, in order to enhance the legitimacy of this new court.
However, as found by the Icelandic Supreme Court, this legal framework had been breached,
particularly by the Minister of Justice, when four of the new Court of Appeal judges had been
appointed. While the Minister had been authorised by law to depart from the Evaluation
Committee’s proposal, subject to certain conditions, she had disregarded a fundamental procedural rule that obliged her to base her decision on sufficient investigation and assessment.
This rule was an important safeguard to prevent the Minister from acting out of political or other undue motives that would undermine the independence and legitimacy of the Court of Appeal, and its breach had been tantamount to restoring the discretionary powers previously held by her office in the context of judicial appointments, thereby neutralising the important gains and guarantees of the legislative reforms.
There had been further legal guarantees in place to remedy the breach committed by the Minister, such as the parliamentary procedure and the ultimate safeguard of judicial review before domestic courts, but all those safeguards had proved ineffective, and the discretion used by the Minister to depart from the Evaluation Committee’s assessment had remained unfettered.
Applying its three-step test, the Court held that the applicant had been denied his right to a “tribunal
established by law” on account of the participation in his trial of a judge whose appointment had
been undermined by grave irregularities which had impaired the very essence of that right.